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CAUTION! ESTOPPEL AHEAD:
CLEVELAND V. POLICYMANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS CORPORA TION
Lawrence B. Solum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation' will pre-
sent the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to make
its first modern2 pronouncement on the doctrine of judicial estoppel,3
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles, California. I owe special thanks to Susanna Griffith
for her research assistance on this project.
1. 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 39
(1998).
2. Cf Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975) (mention-
ing "judicial estoppel" but not analyzing it in context in which intent of Court
to refer to preclusion against inconsistent positions, as opposed to other forms
of preclusion law, can be inferred). The Supreme Court addressed principles
of law that are akin to judicial estoppel in the nineteenth century. See Davis v.
Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895) ("It may be laid down as a general propo-
sition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because
his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the
prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by
him."); Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Howard, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 307, 337 (1851) (affirming exclusion of testimony contrary to posi-
tion taken in prior litigation and stating "[w]e are clearly of opinion, that the
defendant cannot be heard to say, that what was asserted on the former trial
was false, even if the assertion was made by mistake. If it was a mistake, of
which there is no evidence, it was one made by the defendant, of which he took
the benefit, and the plaintiff the loss, and it is too late to correct it. It does not
carry the estoppel beyond what is strictly equitable, to hold that the representa-
tion which defeated one action on a point of form should sustain another on a
like point."). Davis v. Wakelee and Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore
Railroad Co. v. Howard addressed legal rules that appear to have operated
both as rules of evidence-excluding testimony inconsistent with prior state-
462 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:461
also known as preclusion against the assertion of inconsistent posi-
tions.4 The Supreme Court will address judicial estoppel in a par-
ticularly sensitive and controversial context. The courts below, the
Northern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit, invoked the doctrine
of judicial estoppel as the basis for a grant of summary judgment
against Carolyn Cleveland. 5 Ms. Cleveland claimed that Policy
Management Systems Corporation terminated her after it refused to
grant requested accommodations as required by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).6 Ms. Cleveland's claim was judicially es-
topped based on her prior application for social security disability
benefits, in which she had stated that she was unable to work.
The aim of this Commentary is not to argue for a particular
resolution of the dispute between Ms. Cleveland and her former em-
ployer. Rather, the goal is to address a more general question: Is the
Cleveland case an appropriate vehicle for the Supreme Court to
ments-and as equitable defenses.
3. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and
Judicial Estoppel, in JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 134
(3d ed. 1998) (restating federal law of judicial estoppel); 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477 (1981) (covering
preclusion of inconsistent positions); Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Incon-
sistent Positions in Judicial Proceedings, 9 BROOK. L. REV. 245 (1940) (com-
paring equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel); Rand G. Boyers, Comment,
Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 NW.
U. L. REv. 1244 (1986) (sketching out the general policies behind judicial es-
toppel); Douglas W. Henkin, Comment, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields
into Swords and BackAgain, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (1991) (arguing for the
abandonment of the doctrine of judicial estoppel); Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judi-
cial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
409 (1987) (defending the workability of judicial estoppel); Eric A. Schreiber,
Comment, The Judiciary Says, You Can't Have It Both Ways: Judicial Estop-
pel-A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323
(1996) (seeking to reinvigorate the doctrine of judicial estoppel); David M.
Woolley, Note, Procedure-Judicial Estoppel-Sworn Statements, 11 SW. L.J.
96, 96-97 (1957) (discussing relationship between judicial and equitable estop-
pel).
4. See Note, The Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in
Judicial Proceedings, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1946) [hereinafter Harvard
Note].
5. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 513.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12134 (1994).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-32.
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endorse the seldom invoked and controversial 8 doctrine of judicial
estoppel? That doctrine originated in the needs of a procedural sys-
tem that was substantially different from the contemporary system,
which is shaped by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Contemporary understandings of the re-
spective role of judge and jury and the rules of evidence suggest that
a punitive doctrine of judicial estoppel is inconsistent with the search
for truth-the hallmark of American civil procedure. Moreover,
contemporary understandings of the doctrines of claim and issue pre-
clusion eliminate much of the need for a distinct doctrine of judicial
estoppel.
This Commentary will proceed as follows. Part II, "The Context
of Cleveland," lays out the facts and procedural history of the Fifth
Circuit's decision and examines the law of judicial estoppel in gen-
eral and the preclusion of ADA claims in particular.' Part III, "Un-
derstanding Judicial Estoppel: History and Function," takes a larger
view of the judicial estoppel doctrine and discusses its history and
function.' 0 Part IV, "The Case against Supreme Court Endorsement
of Judicial Estoppel," advances the central thesis of this Commen-
tary: Cleveland is an inappropriate vehicle for the Supreme Court to
endorse the controversial doctrine of judicial estoppel." The conclu-
sion of this Commentary is that the Supreme Court should resolve
Cleveland on grounds other than an application of the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel, either rejecting the doctrine of judicial estoppel out-
right or reserving the question of its contemporary viability for an-
other day.12
II. THE CONTEXT OF CLEVELAND
A. The Facts and Procedural History
In August 1993, Carolyn Cleveland took a job with Policy Man-
agement Systems Corporation (PMSC). In January 1994, she had a
8. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
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stroke resulting in the condition of aphasia, affecting her concentra-
tion, memory, and ability to speak, read, and spell. Ms. Cleveland's
daughter helped her file an application for social security. That ap-
plication included the statement that she was and continued to be
"unable to work because of [her] disabling condition on January 7,
1994." 13 In April 1994, Ms. Cleveland went back to work with her
doctor's approval and so informed the Social Security Administra-
tion.14 Back at work, Ms. Cleveland asked her employer to accom-
modate her aphasia disability by giving her computer training, per-
mitting her to take work home in the evening, and transferring her to
another position. She also asked her employer to permit a Texas Re-
habilitation Commission counselor to assist her. PMSC denied all of
these requests and terminated Cleveland in July 1994.'1
Ms. Cleveland renewed her disability benefits application in
September 1994, and in May 1995, she asked for a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Ms. Cleve-
land had become disabled on January 7, 1994, and granted her re-
quest for disability benefits. 16 Before the ALJ decided her claim,
however, Ms. Cleveland filed a civil action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas. Her complaint alleged
that PMSC's termination of her violated the ADA and the Texas La-
bor Code. 17 PMSC moved for partial summary judgment on the
ground that Ms. Cleveland's representations in her disability benefits
application precluded her from claiming that she is a "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" under the ADA.18 The district court granted
this motion and thus entered a final judgment against her on her fed-
eral claim and dismissed her state law claim without prejudice.19
Ms. Cleveland appealed to the United States Court of Appeal for
the Fifth Circuit. She argued the District Court erred by granting
summary judgment against her. As stated by Judge Wiener in his
13. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 514 (5th
Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 515.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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opinion for the court, Ms. Cleveland advanced four arguments on
appeal:
[I]er position in pursuit of social security disability benefits
and her instant position under the ADA are not inconsistent,
as (1) she was disabled for purposes of social security dis-
ability benefits when she filed the initial application; (2)
when she returned to work, she notified the SSA and with-
drew her claim for benefits; and (3) she became disabled
again for purposes of social security disability benefits only
after and as a result of her termination.... [And (4)] from
the time she returned to work until she was terminated, she
could have performed the essential functions of her job with
a reasonable accommodation, i.e., during that period she
was a "qualified individual with a disability."
20
The Court of Appeals rejected Ms. Cleveland's arguments and af-
firmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
21
Judge Wiener noted that the standard of review for a grant of
summary judgment is de novo;22 he then observed the surface incon-
sistency between Ms. Cleveland's assertion that she was able to work
with reasonable accommodations for the purpose of her ADA claim
and her assertion that she was unable "'to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment' 23 for the purposes of her disability benefits
claim. Judge Weiner then gave a brief statement of the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, or preclusion against inconsistent positions: "Judi-
cial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal pro-
ceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or
some earlier proceeding. The doctrine serves a clear purpose: to
protect the integrity of the judicial process." 24 This statement of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel is abstract and incomplete. Judge
Weiner's formulation does not provide a rule of law that could be
applied to the facts of a particular case.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 519.
22. See id. at 515.
23. Id. at 516 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997)).
24. Id. at517.
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The next step in the opinion was to consider the application of
the judicial estoppel doctrine to the facts and procedural history of
Cleveland. Speaking for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Weiner stated:
"We decline, however, to adopt a per se rule that automatically es-
tops an applicant for or recipient of social security disability benefits
from asserting a claim of discrimination under the ADA." 25 The
opinion reasoned that a per se rule of judicial estoppel was inappro-
priate because "under some limited and highly unusual set of circum-
stances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually exclu-
sive. 26 The Fifth Circuit advanced three supporting reasons for this
conclusion. First, the legal standards for establishing disability under
the ADA and the Social Security Act (SSA) differ with respect to the
kind of evidence that is required. The ADA requires individualized
fact-finding whereas the SSA allows for generalized presumptions.2 7
Second, the SSA does not preclude a finding of disability where a
claimant might work if given reasonable accommodations by an em-
ployer.28 Third, the substantive provisions of the SSA allow persons
with disabilities to receive benefits and work under certain circum-
stances, including trial work periods and for pay that falls below a
statutory level.29
Judge Weiner's opinion then set forth a rule governing judicial
estoppel in cases involving ADA claims and claims for disability
benefits:
We hold therefore that the application for or the receipt of
social security disability benefits creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the claimant or recipient of such benefits is
judicially estopped from asserting that he is a "qualified in-
dividual with a disability." We thus leave open the possi-
bility that there might be instances in which the nature and
content of the disability statement submitted to the SSA, in
the context of the particular facts of the case, would not ab-
solutely bar a plaintiff from attempting to demonstrate that
despite his total disability for Social Security purposes he is
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 517-18.
29. See id. at 518.
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a "qualified individual with a disability." Conceivably,
such a plaintiff might be able to rebut this presumption if he
were able to present credible, admissible evidence-such as
his social security disability benefits application, other
sworn documentation, and his allegations relevant to his
ADA claim-sufficient to show that, even though he may
be disabled for purposes of social security, he is otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with a
reasonable accommodation and thus not estopped from as-
serting an ADA claim.3 °
The court concluded that Ms. Cleveland had not presented evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact that would rebut the pre-
sumption that she was judicially estopped from asserting that she was
a "qualified individual with a disability" for the purposes of the ADA
but unable to work for the purposes of her social security disability
claim.31 Hence, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.
On October 5, 1998, the United States Supreme Court granted
Carolyn Cleveland's petition for a writ of certiorari. The order
granting the writ stated:
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted limited to the follow-
ing two questions: 1. Whether the application for, or receipt
of, disability insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, creates a rebuttable presumption that
the applicant or recipient is judicially estopped from as-
serting that she is a "qualified individual with a disability"
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 2. If it does not create such a pre-
sumption, what weight, if any, should be given to the appli-
cation for, or receipt of, disability insurance benefits when a
person asserts she is a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" under the ADA?
32
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
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The Supreme Court will consider these issues in light of a variety of
decisions by the lower federal courts that address the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel in general and the application of that doctrine to ADA
claims similar to that advanced by Ms. Cleveland in particular.
B. The Current State of the Law
Our investigation of the context in which the Supreme Court
will hear Cleveland now turns to the law. Initially, it is useful to
look at the current status of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the
lower federal courts. This Commentary will then consider the appli-
cation of this doctrine to ADA claims.
1. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel in the lower federal courts
Invocation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is actually quite
rare,33 especially when the doctrine is compared to the more tradi-
tional forms of preclusion law, claim preclusion-also known as res
judicata-and issue preclusion-also known as collateral estoppel.
Although the doctrine remains controversial 34 and the elements of
judicial estoppel have never been clearly defined,35 most of the
33. See Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir.
1998) ("Judicial estoppel is a seldom-invoked doctrine .... ."); Konstantinidis
v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (characterizing judicial estoppel
as "obscure"); In re Westchester Tank Fabricators, Ltd., 207 B.R. 391, 400
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Judicial estoppel is rarely invoked . . . ."); Camero v.
Deitert, 10 F. Supp. 2d 440, 441 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Rarely is a judge confronted
with a paradigmatic case for the application of the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1153 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating that judicial estoppel is a "rarely used doctrine"); Loral Fairchild
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 840 F. Supp. 211, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Judicial estoppel is a rarely used doctrine .... ").
34. See Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993)
("The doctrine [of judicial estoppel] has not been uniformly adopted by federal
courts .... "); Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 938 ("Moreover, judicial estoppel
has not been followed by anything approaching a majority of jurisdictions, nor
is there a discernible modem trend in that direction.").
35. See Bates, 997 F.2d at 1037 (noting that the elements of judicial estop-
pel "have never been clearly defined in this Circuit"); Morris v. California, 966
F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Although this circuit has adopted the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, we have not yet determined the circumstances under
which it will be applied."); Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 ("The definitions of
'equitable estoppel' and 'judicial estoppel' vary considerably throughout the
literature of this confused area of the law.").
JUDICAL ESTOPPEL
United States Courts of Appeal have endorsed the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. For example, recent decisions in the First,36 Second,37
Third,38 Fourth,3 9 Fifth,40 Sixth,41 Seventh,42 Eighth,43 Ninth,44
36. See Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 572-73 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 335 (1997) ("Judicial estoppel is not implicated unless
the first forum accepted the legal or factual assertion alleged to be at odds with
the position advanced in the current forum: [W]here a party assumes a certain
position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he
may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a con-
trary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acqui-
esced in the position formerly taken by him .... Judicial estoppel should be
employed when a litigant is 'playing fast and loose with the courts,' and when
'intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair ad-
vantage in a forum provided.for suitors seeking justice."') (citations omitted).
37. See Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997)
("[J]udicial estoppel may be applied to bar a party from asserting a factual po-
sition in a given proceeding only when that party advanced a clearly inconsis-
tent position in a prior proceeding and that inconsistent position was adopted
by the court in some manner....").
38. See In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir. 1998) ("'As-
serting inconsistent positions does not trigger the application of judicial estop-
pel unless intentional self-contradiction is used as a means of obtaining unfair
advantage. Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply when the
prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a
scheme to mislead the court. An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke ju-
dicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing."') (citations
omitted).
39. See Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (4th Cir. 1998)
("In order for judicial estoppel to apply, (1) the party to be estopped must be
advancing an assertion that is inconsistent with a position taken during previ-
ous litigation; (2) the position must be one of fact instead of law; (3) the prior
position must have been accepted by the court in the first proceeding; and (4)
the party to be estopped must have acted intentionally, not inadvertently.").
40. See Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir.
1998) ("Judicial estoppel applies to protect the integrity of the courts-pre-
venting a litigant from contradicting its previous, inconsistent position when a
court has adopted and relied on it.").
41. See Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1998),
petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3800 (U.S. June 9, 1998) (No. 97-1991)
("The doctrine applies only when a party shows that his opponent: (1) took a
contrary position; (2) under oath in a prior proceeding; and (3) the prior posi-
tion was accepted by the court.").
42. See McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3121 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-128) ("A
party envisaging a succession of suits in which a change in position would be
advantageous would have an incentive to falsify the evidence in one of the
January 1999] 469
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Eleventh,45 and Federal Circuits46 have apparently endorsed the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel.
Two circuits have indicated general disapproval of the doctrine.
The Tenth Circuit has recently reaffirmed its longstanding rejection
of the doctrine.4 The D.C. Circuit has also declined to adopt the
doctrine.
48
cases, since it would be difficult otherwise to maintain inconsistent positions.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, however, that the party sought to be
estopped have obtained a favorable judgment or settlement on the basis of a
legal or factual contention that he wants to repudiate in the current litigation.
Otherwise it would be inconsistent with the rule that permits inconsistent
pleadings.") (citations omitted).
43. See Hossaini v. Western Missouri Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th
Cir. 1998) ("We have not heretofore defined with precision the elements of the
doctrine. Among the circuits that have recognized judicial estoppel, the appar-
ent majority view is that the doctrine applies only where the allegedly incon-
sistent prior assertion was accepted or adopted by the court in the earlier litiga-
tion. Under the minority approach, on the other hand, judicial estoppel applies
even where no court has accepted the prior assertion if the party taking con-
trary positions demonstrates an intent to play 'fast and loose' with the courts.")
(citations omitted).
44. See Masayesva ex rel. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371, 1382
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom. Hale v. Secakuku, 118 S.Ct. 1048
(1998) (requiring that earlier court have adopted the prior position and stating
that "[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from taking inconsistent
positions in the same litigation").
45. See Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1422 (1lth Cir. 1998)
("Judicial estoppel 'is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn
positions ... [and] is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of
justice by inconsistent pleadings."') (citation omitted).
46. See Data General Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel is that where a party successfully
urges a particular position in a legal proceeding, it is estopped from taking a
contrary position in a subsequent proceeding where its interests have changed.
Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent the perversion of the judicial process
and, as such, is intended to protect the courts rather than the litigants.") (cita-
tions omitted).
47. See Webb v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir.
1998) ("The Tenth Circuit has firmly established that it will not be bound by
the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel.").
48. See United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984
F.2d 469, 477 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Rawl Sales & Processing Co.
v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Trust, 509 U.S. 924 (1993)
("[W]e have not previously embraced the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this
circuit and we decline to do so in this case. In the circuits that recognize the
doctrine, judicial estoppel is used to preclude a party from taking a position
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There is abstract agreement in the cases on the proposition that
judicial estoppel is a form of preclusion that prevents a party from
asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a
claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.49 Beyond this
general formulation, the elements of the doctrine of judicial estoppel
are uncertain and a matter of dispute.50 Although the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel is sometimes limited to factual assertions, other courts
have held that the doctrine applies to preclude inconsistent legal po-
sitions as well.5 ' Judicial estoppel is sometimes understood as an ab-
solute bar to a litigant asserting inconsistent positions, but this ex-
treme version of the rule seems not to have been widely adopted.
52
Some courts hold that for judicial estoppel to preclude an inconsis-
tent assertion in a second proceeding, the assertion must have been
made under oath in the first proceeding, 53 but other decisions seem to
assume that preclusion may be based on positions taken by counsel.5 4
In diversity cases, there is even controversy over the question of
whether federal or state law governs the doctrine of judicial estoppel
in diversity cases. 55
that is inconsistent with one successfully asserted by the same party in a prior
proceeding.").
49. See FDIC v. Duffy, 47 F.3d 146, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1995); Bates, 997
F.2d at 1028, 1037.
50. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 1713.
51. See, e.g., Continental Illinois Corp. v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 513,
518 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the doctrine forbids a litigant from repudiat-
ing a legal position on which it has prevailed); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d
727, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the doctrine applies to inconsistent legal
assertions as well).
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 438 F.2d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971). See generally Boyers, supra note 3, at
1244, 1246.
53. See United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993).
54. See Cigna Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp., No. 96-
56252, 1998 WL 734391, at *6-7 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1998) (invoking doctrine of
judicial estoppel without reference to "oath" and referring to argument during
opening or closing as possible basis for estoppel).
55. This controversy derives from the requirement, announced in Erie Rail-
road Company v. Tompkins, that federal courts apply state law to resolve sub-
stantive issues in diversity actions. See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937). Compare Al-
len v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
federal law to judicial estoppel issue in diversity case), with Konstantinidis,
626 F.2d at 938 (Erie requires application of the state rule).
January 1999]
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As with the related doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral
estoppel, some decisions do not require the party seeking to benefit
from judicial estoppel to have been a party to the prior proceeding in
order to invoke judicial estoppel. 56 Other courts, however, have held
that a party must have been a party to the prior proceeding to be able
to invoke judicial estoppel against the opposing party in the second
proceeding.57 Judicial estoppel may resemble issue preclusion in an-
other respect: many judicial estoppel opinions state that the assertion
in the prior proceeding must have been successful, 58 which suggests
56. See Allen, 667 F.2d at 1166-68.
57. See Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("No case is cited where the doctrine was applied in favor of a
total stranger to the first phase of the dispute .... ."); Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d
757, 770 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Kansas law is clear that a position taken by a party
in one suit cannot be claimed as working an estoppel in another suit in favor of
a party who was a stranger to the first suit."); Colonial Refrigerated Transp.,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[J]udicial estoppel may be
invoked only by a party to the prior litigation or someone privy to a party.");
Scarano v. Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) ("A plaintiff
who has obtained relief from an adversary by asserting and offering proof to
support one position may not be heard later in the same court to contradict
himself in an effort to establish against the same adversary a second claim in-
consistent with his earlier contention."); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum
Process Co., 99 F.2d 9, 13 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 659 (1939)
("The general rule is that one may not to the prejudice of the other party deny
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same parties or
their privies involving the same subject matter, if successfully maintained.");
Chemical Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 417 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384-85 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
("Defendant in this action, being a legal 'stranger' to the prior action, it may
not avail itself of the defense ofjudicial estoppel based upon plaintiff's alleged
inconsistent legal position in that action.").
58. See General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1505
(9th Cir. 1995) (judicial estoppel invoked if court actually adopted earlier in-
consistent statement); Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 762 (5th
Cir. 1994); Bates, 997 F.2d at 1038; Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260,
264-65 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he party to be estopped must have convinced the
first court to adopt its position; a litigant is not forever bound to a losing argu-
ment."). A further question arises with respect to the definition of success or
judicial adoption. Some decisions indicate that settlement of a matter consti-
tutes success. See Kale v. Obuchowski, 985 F.2d 360, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1993)
(settlement is the same as prevailing, and a judicial decision is not necessary).
The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that settlement does not imply judicial en-
dorsement. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs.,
44 F.3d 925, 930 (1lth Cir. 1995). See generally Schreiber, supra note 3, at
338-44. Some courts have held that judicial estoppel can apply even if the
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that it is the prior adjudication of the issue and not merely the party's
assertion of a position that is being given preclusive effect.
2. Preclusion of inconsistent positions in disability cases
The confusion and disagreement that characterize the law of ju-
dicial estoppel in general are evident in the particular context of
claims arising under the ADA.59 The issue of judicial estoppel has
arisen most frequently in recent years in the context of ADA cases.
Defendant employers may invoke the doctrine against a plaintiff
making an ADA claim who has previously applied for disability
benefits, such as those provided by the SSA. In an application for
disability benefits, plaintiffs attest to their total disability, thereby
creating a perceived factual inconsistency with their later claim that
they are qualified to work under the ADA.
The courts of appeal are divided on the proper application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel in the context of ADA claims. Judicial
estoppel against ADA claims that are inconsistent with the claim-
ant's position in a prior disability benefits claim has been approved
in the Second,60 Third,6 1 and Fifth 2 Circuits. Theoretical approval
of judicial estoppel of ADA claims on possible facts other than those
before the court has been expressed in the First,
63 Fourth,64 Ninth,65
party was not successful in the prior proceeding if the court finds that its integ-
rity was undermined by the party engaging in "fast and loose" behavior. See,
e.g., United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that judicial estoppel can apply even if party was previously unsuccessful).
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12134.
60. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1997)
(plaintiff who stated in application for social security disability benefits that he
was "unable to work' was judicially estopped from advancing a claim of age
discrimination).
61. Compare McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that employee was judicially estopped from denying inability to
work), with Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir.
1997) (discussing criticism of McNemar and denying judicial estoppel effect to
prior representations where elements of retaliation claim under ADA did not
require showing of ability to work).
62. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517
(5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
63. See Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 44 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1998) (noting but not deciding that judicial estoppel might apply to plain-
tiff's ADA claim because "the parties have already made various factual and
legal assertions on the record in the state administrative proceedings.").
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and Eleventh 66 Circuits. Application of the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel to ADA claims appears to have been rejected in the Sixth,67
Seventh, 68 Tenth,69 and the D.C. Circuits. 70  The Federal Circuit,
which has a specialized subject matter jurisdiction,71 has not ad-
dressed the application ofjudicial estoppel to ADA claims.
III. UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL: HISTORY AND FUNCTION
Both the doctrine of judicial estoppel in general and its applica-
tion to ADA claims in particular have generated considerable dis-
agreement and confusion in the lower federal courts. To clarify the
development of this discord, this section examines some of the his-
tory and context of judicial estoppel.
72
64. See Cathcart v. Flagstar Corp., No. 97-1977, 1998 WL 390834, at *9
(4th Cir. June 29, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (declining to apply judicial es-
toppel where plaintiff's disability claim was rejected by Social Security Ad-
ministration, but noting when doctrine might otherwise apply).
65. See Johnson v. Oregon Dep't of Human Resources, 141 F.3d 1361,
1367-69 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that "neither application for nor receipt of dis-
ability benefits automatically bars a claimant from establishing that she is a
qualified person with a disability under the ADA," but discussing cases in
which judicial estoppel might apply).
66. See Taylor, 133 F.3d at 1423 (declining to apply per sejudicial estoppel
rule, but "the determination of whether an individual who has certified total
disability to the SSA is judicially estopped from later bringing a claim under
the ADA will depend upon the specific statements made in the application and
other relevant evidence in the record.").
67. See Griffith, 135 F.3d at 383 (holding that receipt of disability benefits
does not preclude subsequent ADA relief and rejecting the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in that context, but allowing the consideration of prior sworn state-
ments by the parties as a material factor).
68. See McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1164 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("[O]n applications for Social Security disability benefits, certifica-
tion of total disability does not completely bar the argument that one is a quali-
fied individual with a disability.").
69. See Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, 143 F.3d 1324, 1330-31
(10th Cir. 1998) (denying judicial estoppel effect to plaintiff's prior application
for Social Security disability benefits and stating that ADA, unlike the SSA,
does take into consideration whether accommodation would render plaintiff
able to perform ajob).
70. See Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582,
586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that receipt of disability benefits does not auto-
matically preclude subsequent ADA relief).
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
72. Even a cursory history of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is beyond the
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A. Some Notes on the History of Judicial Estoppel
Some early references to "judicial estoppel" do not actually dis-
cuss a form of preclusion against inconsistent positions but instead
refer to related doctrines such as issue preclusion, 73 claim
scope of this brief Commentary. Instead, this Commentary investigates the
development of the doctrine in the federal courts with a particular emphasis on
its relationship to the related doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.
73. See Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1928) (using the
phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to issue preclusion in the following passage:
"By both sides cases are cited upon the general subject of the effect by way of
judicial estoppel of a judgment in a criminal case when invoked in a subse-
quent civil action between the same parties."); Fung Yun Ham v. Nagle, 22
F.2d 600, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1927) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer
to issue preclusion in the following passage: "The suggestions that petitioner
is entitled to a judicial hearing, and that the former administrative action in
landing the father as a native-born citizen constitutes a judicial estoppel, are
thought to be ruled adversely by prior decisions of this court. The fact that the
father, who resides in, and claims to be a citizen of, the United States, joins in
the petition with the nonresident applicant, in no wise affects the latter's status,
or enlarges his rights.") (citations omitted); Ex Parte Mock Kee Song, 19 F.
Supp. 743, 745 (N.D. Cal. 1937) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer
to issue preclusion in the following passage: "While the fact of applicant's un-
challenged trips to China and return, between 1909 and 1930, and the admis-
sions of his alleged sons, may be considered with other evidence by the Board
of Special Inquiry in determining applicant's right of entry, such former ad-
ministrative action does not constitute a judicial estoppel."); Boise Title &
Trust Co. v. Evans, 295 F. 223, 224 (D. Id. 1924) (using the phrase "judicial
estoppel" to refer to issue preclusion in the following passage: "In a manda-
mus proceeding brought by the plaintiff against the sheriff, the Supreme Court
of this state adopted the plaintiff's view, and held that stamps were not re-
quired. The defendant here was not a party to that proceeding, and accordingly
it is conceded that the judgment therein does not constitute a judicial estop-
pel.") (citation omitted); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheegog, 177 F. 756, 759-60
(C.C.W.D. Ky. 1910) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to issue
preclusion in the following passage: "This holding is inconsistent with a
holding that this court acquired jurisdiction by the attempted removal. The
judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in a case where the parties were
the same, and the questions for decision were substantially the same, as here,
and it would seem to me that the principle of judicial estoppel applies; and, if
so, the complainant here cannot allege a matter which is inconsistent with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in the other case. That court is the final arbiter in
a controversy of this sort; and it would seem that when it has once determined
the question on a contest made by one of the parties, and by a recognized pro-
cedure, adequate for the purpose, such determination should conclude it, as
between the parties.").
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preclusion, 74 both issue and claim preclusion, 75 an election of reme-
dies doctrine, 76 or some other rule of law.77 The first clear reference
by a federal court to preclusion against inconsistent positions under
74. See Van Norden v. Charles R. McCormick Lumber Co., 27 F.2d 881,
881 (9th Cir. 1928) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to claim pre-
clusion in the following passage: "This is an action for the identical personal
injury for which damages were sought in [a prior adjudication]. The parties
also are the same, and the negligence alleged is that specified... in the former
opinion. Correctly, we think, the court below held that the judgment in that
case operates as a judicial estoppel.") (citation omitted); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Blankenhom, 25 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1928) (using the
phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to claim preclusion in the following passage:
"We do not inquire into the grounds of such contention, for, having been duly
submitted to the state courts, the question is thought to be res adjudicata. To
hold otherwise would be to scuttle the whole doctrine ofjudicial estoppel."); In
re Lyders, 16 F. Supp. 213, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1936) (using the phrase "judicial
estoppel" to refer to claim preclusion in the following passage: "' [The bank-
ruptcy referee's] order, made after hearing and not challenged by any pro-
ceedings for review, became a judicial determination of the issues then before
him, and, like any other final judgment or order, is binding upon the parties
thereto. It constitutes ajudicial estoppel."') (citation omitted).
75. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Porter, 3 F.2d 57, 59 (D. Id.
1924) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to claim and issue preclu-
sion in the following passage: "The decided cases involving the doctrine of
judicial estoppel are numerous, and in some respects are difficult to reconcile.
Generally speaking, the scope of the estoppel is broader in a case where the
former judgment was upon the same cause of action than where the causes of
action are different; in the former, the judgment is conclusive, not only of the
questions actually adjudicated, but also of those which might properly have
been submitted, while in the latter the estoppel extends only to such issues as
were actually determined.").
76. See Parkerson v. Borst, 264 F. 761, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1920) (using the
phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to an election of remedies doctrine in the
following passage: "We thus reach the assignment on which counsel seems
mainly to rely, that the action of Mrs. Borst in proving her claim in bankruptcy
constituted a judicial estoppel, or estoppel of record, against her to further
prosecute this suit, in that, as they claim, that action was an affirmance of her
title to the notes, and necessarily a disaffirmance of her action for conversion..
. [S]he would not have been estopped to proceed with her suit for conversion,
since her action, by any process of reasoning, could not have been construed as
the election by her of an inconsistent remedy, but merely a following of some
of the proceeds of a conversion, for the purpose of application and credit pro
tanto on her claim.").
77. See Hurd v. Moiles, 28 F. 897, 899 (C.C.D. Mich. 1886) (using the
phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to the possibility of enjoining litigation that
concerns the same subject matter as pending action).
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the rubric of "judicial estoppel" appears to have been made by the
Third Circuit in 1929.7 ' Aside from this single instance, the phrase
"judicial estoppel" appears not to have been used again by the fed-
eral courts to refer to preclusion against inconsistent positions until
the 1950s, when the Fifth Circuit mentioned the doctrine in pass-
ing.79 During the 1950s, however, the courts continued to use the
phrase to refer to other doctrines. 80 With the exception of the Fifth
Circuit's apparent endorsement of judicial estoppel in dicta, reaction
78. See Emlenton Ref. Co. v. Chambers, 35 F.2d 273, 276 (3d Cir. 1929)
("The next equitable defenses disposed of by the court adversely to the defen-
dant preliminary to trial are that both the legal plaintiff and use plaintiff are
precluded by equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel from maintaining the in-
stant action. These defenses of estoppel are based on the uncertain conduct of
Chambers and Adams in instituting and prosecuting successive litigation in
different names thereby causing the defendant considerable expense and very
great annoyance, and with respect to that of judicial estoppel based also on the
inconsistent positions taken by Chambers and Adams in the series of suits and
their inconsistent statements made and sworn to in the progress of the litiga-
tion.").
79. See Livesay Indus. v. Livesay Window Co., 202 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir.
1953) (referring to "every principle of judicial estoppel, including the estoppel
arising out of inconsistent positions in legal proceedings"). Without using the
phrase "judicial estoppel," the Third Circuit discussed a limited form of the
doctrine in the 1953 decision Scarano v. Central Railroad Co., 203 F.2d 510,
513 (3d Cir. 1953), stating that a "plaintiff who has obtained relief from an ad-
versary by asserting and offering proof to support one position may not be
heard later in the same court to contradict himself in an effort to establish
against the same adversary a second claim inconsistent with his earlier conten-
tion." Scarano cited a treatise and New Jersey authority for the doctrine and
cited no federal authority, but did not explicitly state whether the court consid-
ered New Jersey law to be binding. See id.
80. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fulcher, 201 F.2d 751, 754 (4th Cir.
1953) ("Judicial estoppel and resjudicata are frequently used interchangeably
and have the same significance.") (quoting Gilmer v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16, 18
(Va. 1947); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954,
958 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (using the phrase "judicial estoppel" to refer to issue pre-
clusion in the following passage: "In order to apply the principle of judicial
estoppel two requisites must be present, (1) identity of parties, that is, the party
sought to be bound should be a party to both actions, and must have appeared
in both in the same character or capacity; and (2) identity of issues, that is, a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially
passed on and determined is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and it
is immaterial that the question alleged to have been settled by such former ad-
judication was determined in a different kind of proceeding or a different form
of action or for different purposes.").
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to the doctrine in the 1950s was generally unfavorable. 81 Assertions
of the doctrine drew the scorn of Judges Moore 82 and Learned
Hand83 of the Second Circuit and a strong rejection of the doctrine
from the Tenth Circuit. 4
Judicial estoppel as preclusion against inconsistent positions ap-
peared again in a 1964 diversity case, when the Middle District of
Tennessee declined to extend Tennessee's version of judicial estop-
pe185 to a prior statement made in a legislative hearing.8 6  In
81. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Vail, 166 F. Supp. 777, 784 (D.S.D. 1958) (de-
nying judicial estoppel in a context that is ambiguous as to whether issue pre-
clusion or preclusion against inconsistent positions is intended: "Plaintiff
contends that because Nelson signed the stipulation settling the death claim of
the widow of Philip L. Wineman, deceased, before the Iowa Industrial Com-
mission and admitted therein that Wineman was his employee and was, at the
time of the accident, acting in the course of his employment, Nelson was there-
fore judicially estopped in this case to deny the relationship of master-servant.
While there seems to be some split of authority, the general rule as to judicial
estoppel appears to be that the parties in the two proceedings must be the same,
and that actions in former proceedings which might be a basis for an estoppel
will not operate for the benefit of persons who were not parties to the former
proceedings.").
82. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 259 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir.
1958) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel, as urged here, would extend estoppel
beyond all reasonable bounds.").
83. See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 837
(2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting on grounds other than judicial estoppel) ("I
can find no warrant for the theory that they created a 'judicial estoppel,' except
suggestions in one or two law reviews.").
84. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956)
("[W]e must reject the theory that the pleading of a claim under oath ... ir-
revocably freezes the contentions of the pleader so that under no circumstances
may he alter his view in that, or another, case, or assert an inconsistent posi-
tion. This would.., discourage the determination of cases on the basis of the
true facts as they might be established ultimately.").
85. Tennessee's version of judicial estoppel was limited to inconsistent
statements made under oath. The strict doctrine of judicial estoppel is fre-
quently said to find its origin in Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. 38, 48
(1857). See Boyers, supra note 3, at 1245 & n.10.
86. See United States v. Certain Land and Interests in Property, 225 F.
Supp. 338, 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1964) ("It is thus apparent that the doctrine of 'ju-
dicial estoppel' has not been extended beyond statements made under oath in
judicial proceedings, that the doctrine is not strictly speaking an 'estoppel by
oath', and that one will not be estopped to deny the truth of all statements
made under oath, whether in the course* of litigation or not. It is believed that
the Supreme Court of Tennessee would not, if faced with this issue, extend the
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subsequent cases during the 1960s, judicial estoppel was applied in
diversity cases, 87 likely on the theory that the Erie doctrine required
its application; other cases mentioned the doctrine but declined to
apply it on the facts before the court.8 9 In the 1970s, the doctrine was
invoked more frequently. Most cases invoking the doctrine rejected
its application on the facts before the court,90 but the doctrine was
doctrine to legislative hearings.").
87. See Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 388 F.2d 291, 292 (6th Cir.
1968) (applying judicial estoppel where plaintiff in personal injury action
made statements inconsistent with those made previously during a workmen's
compensation proceeding); Holt v. Southern Ry. Co., 51 F.R.D. 296, 298 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969) (applying Tennessee doctrine of judicial estoppel in diversity case
to bar claims that were inconsistent with factual positions taken in deposition
under oath in prior litigation).
88. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
89. See Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 550
(5th Cir. 1968) (declining to apply judicial estoppel, apparently under Texas
law, because parties in prior action were different); Markow v. Alcock, 356
F.2d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Turning now to appellant's contention that a
judicial estoppel is applicable by reason of the stipulation in settlement of the
McClellan matter as against the defendant banks, it does appear as a general
rule that parties entering into stipulations during the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding are estopped to take positions inconsistent therewith. But this rule
does not apply if the estoppel is urged in a subsequent proceeding where the
parties are different.") (citations omitted).
90. See Himel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 596 F.2d 205,
211 (7th Cir. 1979) (declining to apply judicial estoppel and stating that "[t]he
doctrine is not applicable here because, as discussed above, the facts here are
not 'the same facts' in the first suit."); Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 770
(10th Cir. 1977) (declining judicial estoppel in diversity on the basis of Kansas
law requirement that party asserting judicial estoppel must have been a party to
the prior action); City of Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370, 1377 (5th Cir.
1977) (declining judicial estoppel effect in diversity case on the basis of "the
lack of any apparent prejudice resulting from this representation" as required
by Florida law); Walker v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 529 F.2d 1163, 1164
(5th Cir. 1976) (declining application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel and
stating that "the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable in this case, in that
plaintiffs assumed the [prior inconsistent] position ... based on the representa-
tions of the defendant"); In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir. 1975)
(declining application of doctrine of judicial estoppel on ground that issue in
prior case was "essentially dissimilar" from issue with respect to which estop-
pel was sought); In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271,
279 (5th Cir. 1974) (declining application of judicial estoppel and stating:
"Our holding that the issue here differs from the issue before the Exchequer
Court precludes the application of any type of estoppel."); Johnson Serv. Co. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175 (5th Cir. 1973) (declining to apply
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Texas doctrine of judicial estoppel in diversity case on ground that prior incon-
sistent statements were not pleadings made under oath); Gleason v. United
States, 458 F.2d 171, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1972) (declining to apply judicial estop-
pel to personal injury action on ground that party seeking estoppel had not
been prejudiced by defendants' prior assertion of inconsistent workers com-
pensation claim); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 130
(6th Cir. 1971) (declining to apply judicial estoppel to claim of racial discrimi-
nation in termination on the basis of prior claim that discharge resulted from
union activity and stating, "Despite the seeming inconsistency in appellee's
positions, a consideration of the context of the union activities indicates that
the inconsistency is of form rather than substance."); Smith v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 438 F.2d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1971) (declining to apply the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel and stating, "Despite the seeming conflict in the positions of the
company in its income tax forms and the witnesses in the instant action, we
find no cases where the Tennessee doctrine of judicial estoppel was extended
to inconsistencies between judicial and non-judicial statements."); United
States v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 440, 442 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (declining to apply
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel and stating that "[t]he scope of that doctrine is nar-
row, particularly when applied to the government. Generally, it pertains to
statements made under oath in judicial proceedings, and does not apply where
the prior statement is merely an expression of opinion or legal conclusion.")
(citations omitted); Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 397 n.9 (D. Kan.
1979) ("Several factors make such an application of the judicial estoppel doc-
trine inappropriate in this situation. For example, a normal prerequisite to ap-
plication of the doctrine is identity of parties, an element not present here.
Also, the doctrine normally applies only to statements of fact, not legal conclu-
sions.") (citation omitted); Ivor B. Clark Co. v. Southern Bus. & Indus. Dev.
Co., 399 F. Supp. 824, 837 (S.D. Miss. 1974) (declining application of doctrine
of judicial estoppel on ground that the prior inconsistent statement "in question
was not made during the course of a judicial proceeding" but was instead made
in connection with the filing of a lien); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1179 (D.S.C. 1974) (recognizing doctrine of judicial estop-
pel but declining its application on ground that prior position was on different
issue than that with respect to which estoppel was sought); Johnson Services
Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (de-
clining to apply doctrine of judicial estoppel in diversity case governed by
Texas law and stating: "First, the state court action involved different defen-
dants from those at bar. Secondly, the recovery granted the Plaintiff in the
state court action is consistent with that sought here, since Plaintiff has reduced
its allegation of damages here by that amount already obtained in the state
court action .... ") (citation omitted); Maddox v. Bradley, 345 F. Supp. 1255,
1258 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (declining to apply doctrine of judicial estoppel against
the United States and stating that "[a]lthough generally the doctrine of preclu-
sion can be asserted against the United States of America, it is not applicable if
the use of the doctrine would be against public policy, or if those taking the
prior inconsistent position exceeded their authority in doing so").
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actually applied as the basis for decision in a few cases. 9' Similarly,
during the early 1980s, a large number of courts refused to apply the
doctrine on the facts before them,92 although there are several cases
in which the doctrine was applied.93
91. See Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Kobelinski, 421 F. Supp. 431, 435 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (applying judicial estoppel against Small Business Administration
and stating that "[t]he SBA has procured a dismissal in the prior action by
contending that the Court lacked jurisdiction and now wishes to effect a re-
moval by asserting that the Court has jurisdiction."); Gravitt v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 830, 831 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (applying Texas doc-
trine of judicial estoppel as basis for remand of diversity action to inconsistent
allegations regarding citizenship of defendant); cf Wade v. Woodings-Verona
Tool Works, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 465, 467 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (not presented with
judicial estoppel issue in action before the court but relying on the future appli-
cability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on sworn statement in that
action as basis for rejection of summary judgment motion).
92. See American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 833 n.44 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (declining to reach question whether judicial estoppel is recognized un-
der Circuit's interpretation of federal law by stating that "[n]either initial suc-
cess before a prior court nor deliberate manipulation are evident on this rec-
ord"); Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984)
(denying judicial estoppel on ground that there was no necessary conflict be-
tween current and prior positions); DeShong v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,
737 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Because inconsistency is the crucial
element of the doctrine of estoppel, there is no basis for applying estoppel in
this case."); American Nat'l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d
1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983) (declining application of judicial estoppel where
record did not support finding of bad faith and inconsistency had been cured by
prior action of court); Garcia v. Andrus, 692 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1982) (stat-
ing that "judicial estoppel bars only inconsistent positions"); Edwards v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982) (declining to apply judicial
estoppel on ground that party "did not successfully assert an inconsistent posi-
tion in the previous proceeding"); Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d
Cir. 1981) ("We find no exceptional circumstances in this case that would al-
low Ashley to raise judicial estoppel on appeal."); Bates v. Cook, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 662, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (declining judicial estoppel on grounds that it
does not apply to legal conclusions and that it requires success in prior pro-
ceeding); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 102 F.R.D. 450, 453 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (declining judicial estoppel on ground that doctrine is appropriate
"where a litigant would reap a double benefit from switching claims"); Latino
Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 581 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.
Mass. 1984) (declining judicial estoppel on ground that party "took no stand at
all on the question... in the earlier litigation"); Brownko Int'l, Inc. v. Ogden
Steel Co., 585 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that court is "un-
persuaded" by judicial estoppel argument); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 920-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Leaving aside the
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A review of the cases suggests that the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel developed without substantial judicial attention to either the
history or function of the doctrine. Many of the federal judicial es-
toppel cases pay lip service to the doctrine but reject its application
question of the vitality of this doctrine in this Circuit or elsewhere, the doctrine
would not apply here in any case because the courts that have applied the doc-
trine have required that 'success in the prior proceeding is clearly an essential
element ofjudicial estoppel,' and a 'settlement neither requires nor implies any
judicial endorsement of either party's claims or theories, and thus a settlement
does not provide the prior success necessary for judicial estoppel."') (citations
and footnote omitted); USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302,
1306 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (declining application of judicial estoppel because liti-
gant was not successful on prior inconsistent claim); Atlanta Shipping Corp. v.
International Modular Hous., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1356, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(declining application of judicial estoppel on basis that change of positions was
not in "bad faith"); Byrne v. Buffalo Creek R.R. Co., 536 F. Supp. 1301, 1303
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that "it would be inappropriate at this time, after the
trial of this case, to afford defendants the advantage of the affirmative defense
of estoppel, which was not pleaded as such in their answers"); Toman v. Un-
derwriters Lab., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (D. Mass. 1982) ("Absent the
existence of a dispute between the same parties, or reliance or change of posi-
tion by the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel, the doctrine will not be
applied.") rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1983); National Un-
ion Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F. Supp. 991, 1012 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ("Neither do we regard NUE's failure to take exception to the ap-
praiser's report or the stance it assumed in the Delaware proceeding as being
inconsistent with the position it here espouses, and thus we do not find this to
be an instance where the doctrine of judicial estoppel has application."); In re
Lincoln Plaza Towers Assocs., 6 B.R. 808, 811 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from assuming inconsis-
tent positions with respect to the same matter. But we find nothing inconsis-
tent in the legal or factual postures assumed by this debtor.") (citation omitted).
93. See Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1982)
(applying judicial estoppel on basis of prior inconsistent assertion that plaintiff
was an employee of defendant's insured); United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l v.
B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 641 F.2d 185, 189-90 (4th Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing judicial estoppel on the basis of prior inconsistent assertion in bankruptcy
proceeding); Van Gaalen v. Sparks, 555 F. Supp. 325, 329 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(applying Virginia doctrine ofjudicial estoppel to bar claims); United States v.
Bedford Assocs., 548 F. Supp. 732, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying judicial
estoppel to change in position by United States), aff'd on other grounds, 713
F.2d 895, 904 (2d Cir. 1983); Donovan v. United States Postal Serv., 530 F.
Supp. 894, 902 (D.D.C. 1981) (applying judicial estoppel in federal question
case); In re VVF Communications Corp., 41 B.R. 546, 553 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1984) (applying judicial estoppel to prior inconsistent positions in earlier stage
of bankruptcy action); In re Holiday Isles, Ltd., 29 B.R. 827, 831 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1983) (applying judicial estoppel in bankruptcy case).
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on the ground that some requirement was not satisfied. Many of the
decisions were diversity cases in which the federal court assumed
that it was bound by state law formulations of the judicial estoppel
doctrine. Most of the cases that did apply the doctrine rely on for-
mulaic recitations, often citing a legal encyclopedia as authority.
Almost none of the reported decisions address a crucial question:
What function does the doctrine of judicial estoppel serve in the
context of a modem procedural system that has adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence and that
has adopted the contemporary doctrines of issue and claim preclu-
sion? It is to that question that this Commentary now turns.
B. Judicial Estoppel in the Context of Modern Preclusion Law
The doctrine that is now known as judicial estoppel has its roots
in nineteenth century American law. During this period, the modem
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion had not clearly emerged. The
term "judicial estoppel" was frequently used as a synonym for res
judicata or collateral estoppel. Modem claim and issue preclusion
law provides a powerful array of tools for preventing the relitigation
of claims and issues that have been decided in a prior adjudication.
The modem doctrine of claim preclusion would preclude a party who
prevails on a claim and then seeks additional relief based on an in-
consistent position, so long as the claims are based on the same
transaction or the same factual allegations. 94 The modem doctrine of
issue preclusion would preclude a party who prevails on an issue and
then seeks to take an inconsistent position against the same opponent
in a subsequent action, so long as the issues are identical and were
actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior action.95 De-
pending on the circumstances, issue preclusion may also be available
to a stranger to the prior action under the rules governing "nonmutual
collateral estoppel.,
96
These modem rules are quite different from the inconsistent
patchwork of nineteenth century preclusion law. This proposition is
94. See Solum, supra note 3, 131.
95. See id. 132.
96. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984); Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324-26 (1971).
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illustrated by the traditional mutuality rule for issue preclusion. In
some cases, judicial estoppel in the form of preclusion against incon-
sistent positions may have been the only form of preclusion available
to a party in a subsequent action who wished to bind an opponent to
the determination of an issue in a prior litigation in which the party
seeking the estoppel was not joined.
Indeed, the influential Harvard Law Review Note, The Doctrine
of Preclusion against Inconsistent Positions,97 focused on exactly
this role for the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The following quota-
tion illustrates how the availability of other preclusion doctrines
shaped scholarly and judicial opinion about the doctrine of judicial
estoppel:
Text writers commonly say that a personal judgment or a
position taken in a previous judicial proceeding has no ef-
fect in a suit between different parties unless there is a rela-
tionship of privity between each new party and one of the
original parties. Thus, a stranger to a judgment cannot take
advantage of the prior proceeding. There are, however, a
series of cases in which the courts have precluded a person
from framing his testimony or pleadings in a manner incon-
sistent with a position taken in a prior proceeding even
though one or both parties were different and no relation-
ship of privity existed. These cases are based upon the
principle that a litigant should not be permitted, either by
passive consent or by affirmative action, to lead a court to
find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial
proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise.
98
The student author of the Harvard Note concluded that:
[t]he primary distinction in practice between the principle
of preclusion [against inconsistent positions] on the one
hand and res judicata and collateral estoppel on the other is
that, while the latter doctrines require identity of parties, the
former may be invoked by a person not a party to the first
97. Harvard Note, supra note 4.
98. Id. at 1132.
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suit against one who was either a witness or a party in that
suit.
9 9
Of course, if the primary difference between judicial estoppel
and issue preclusion was the traditional mutuality rule, the relation-
ship between the two doctrines needs to be reexamined in light of
modem cases authorizing both defensive and offensive nonmutual
collateral estoppel.l00 Illustrative of the modem approach is the view
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an oppos-
ing party, in accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also pre-
cluded from doing so with another person unless the fact
that he [or she] lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify af-
fording him [or her] an opportunity to relitigate the issue.
The circumstances to which considerations should be given
include those enumerated in § 28 and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would
be incompatible with an applicable scheme of administering
the remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party
against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportuni-
ties in the presentation and determination of the issue that
were not available in the first action and could likely result
in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or
to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder
in the first action between himself [or herself] and his [or
her] present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself
inconsistent with another determination of the same issue;
99. Id. at 1134. Not all of the judicial estoppel cases agree with the Har-
vard Note with respect to the question of whether mutuality is required in judi-
cial estoppel cases. See Scarano v. Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d
Cir. 1953) (formulating doctrine with mutuality rule).
100. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 158; Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326;
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324-26.
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(5) The prior determination may have been affected by
relationships among the parties to the first action that are
not present in the subsequent action, or apparently were
based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may
complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action
or prejudice the interests of another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively
determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for
obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it
was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate
that the party be permitted to relitigate the issue.
10 1
To the extent that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has been for-
mulated to allow nonmutual collateral estoppel without reference to
these factors, the question arises as to why this is so. Although the
assertion of an inconsistent position in a prior litigation might be a
factor favoring the application of issue preclusion, it is not apparent
why it should be a decisive factor that trumps all of the other consid-
erations used in making the decision to grant nonmutual collateral
estoppel. Although the aim of this Commentary is not to resolve the
Cleveland case on its facts, we should note that Cleveland is itself a
case involving nonmutual application of the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel. PMSC was not a party to Ms. Cleveland's application for
disability benefits.
It has been argued that judicial estoppel avoids other require-
ments of issue preclusion-in particular, the requirement that the is-
sue with respect to which preclusion is sought have been actually
litigated and necessarily decided in the prior action.102 According to
this argument, courts can "impose judicial estoppel in situations
where [they] would otherwise be forced to allow repetitious and ille-
gitimate litigation to proceed."'1 3 In other words, judicial estoppel
"enables courts to provide relief in cases where collateral estoppel
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
102. See Plumer, supra note 3, at 415-16.
103. Id. at416.
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cannot."'1 4 But this argument proves too much. If the doctrine of
issue preclusion has been formulated too narrowly to serve the twin
goals of achieving judicial economy while preserving accuracy, the
proper response would be to craft a more liberal doctrine of issue
preclusion. Judicial estoppel provides only an ad hoc remedy that
would address the problem only where there is the fortuity of a prior
inconsistent position.
The point of this discussion is to frame the following question:
Should the Supreme Court recognize judicial estoppel as a distinct
preclusion doctrine, governed by a unique set of rules that differ
from those applicable to claim and issue preclusion? Framing the
question in this way juxtaposes judicial estoppel with the other pre-
clusion doctrines in their modem form. Judicial estoppel does not
stand in isolation from the general fabric of American law. If the
Supreme Court considers adopting the doctrine of judicial estoppel in
the Cleveland case, it should pay close attention to the role that this
doctrine will play in light of the principles and policies that animate
the American system of procedure.
In this regard, we should recall Judge Learned Hand's observa-
tion of the relationship between the doctrine of judicial estoppel and
preclusion law in general. Writing in dissent on another issue, Judge
Hand was required to deal with a judicial estoppel claim avoided by
the majority's disposition of the case. He stated:
It will be necessary as a preliminary [sic] to deal with the
plaintiffs' agreement that, regardless of whether the defen-
dant had in fact been "transacting business," its denials that
it had been in at least ten actions brought against it in both
state and federal courts constituted a "judicial estopper'
against its present contradictory position. It is of course
true that upon the trial in the actions at bar any statements
made by the defendant in its pleadings and affidavits in
other actions were competent evidence in favor of the
plaintiffs; but I can find no warrant for the theory that they
created a "judicial estoppel," except suggestions in one or
two law reviews. Moreover, since such a doctrine is plainly
contrary to the underlying basis of the whole doctrine of
104. Id.
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estoppel by judgment it is plainly without foundation.
Judgment by estoppel is not designed as a moral sanction
against inconsistency: it does not visit penalties upon those
who take one position today and deny it tomorrow; it is de-
signed only to prevent a party who has, or has not, prevailed
upon an issue in an earlier action to vex the same antagonist
with the same dispute in a later one.
10 5
Since Judge Hand's day, our view of the role of issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, has been enlarged, but his essential point remains
relevant. Preclusion law strikes a balance between the search for
truth on the one hand and the conservation of judicial resources and
fairness to opposing parties on the other. "Playing fast and loose
with the truth" is not admirable, but preclusion law is a tool ill suited
to the task of punishing perjury or insuring truthful allegations in
pleadings.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST SUPREME COURT ENDORSEMENT OF JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL
Although a number of arguments have been advanced in favor
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a close examination reveals that
there is no compelling justification for a separate doctrine of judicial
estoppel. A general rule of preclusion against inconsistent positions
is incompatible with the search for truth and commitment of fact-
finding to the jury.
A. The Purported Rationale for Judicial Estoppel
What is the purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel? The
Third Circuit's opinion in Scarano v. Central Railroad Company1
0 6
provided one of the clearest statements:
Such use of inconsistent positions would most flagrantly
exemplify that playing "fast and loose with the courts"
which has been emphasized as an evil the courts should not
tolerate.... And this is more than affront to judicial dig-
nity. For intentional self-contradiction is being used as a
105. Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 837 (2d
Cir. 1957) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
106. 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953).
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means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided
for suitors seeking justice.!
0 7
Two functions are suggested here for the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel. The first purpose of the doctrine is to guard against deception;
or in other words, to protect the accuracy of judicial proceedings
against litigants who might engage in deceptive behavior. The sec-
ond purpose is to prevent a litigant from taking unfair advantage of
an opponent, presumably by prevailing in two different actions on
the basis of inconsistent positions. Both of these purposes require
further analysis.
B. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Advance the Search for Truth
Is the doctrine of judicial estoppel justified by its contribution to
the accuracy of judicial proceedings? Initially, it should be observed
that the search for truth is surely one of the cardinal measures of pro-
cedural fairness. 10 8 As one court has recognized, "the ultimate aim
of the judicial system is to ascertain the real truth."' 0 9 But does judi-
cial estoppel serve this end? In an obvious sense, the answer is no.
Judicial estoppel operates to prevent the finder of fact or judge of law
in a subsequent litigation from determining whether the position be-
ing asserted in that case is factually true or legally correct. Conse-
quently, the effect of the estoppel is to bind the judge or jury in the
subsequent action to the position asserted in the prior action, even if
that position was incorrect as a matter of law or fact. As the Tenth
Circuit put it, judicial estoppel "would discourage the determination
of cases on the basis of the true facts that they might be established
ultimately.""'  This effect is a truism with respect to all of the prior
107. Id. at 513.
108. See, e.g., Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290,
294 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating "the search for truth ... is at the heart of the litiga-
tion process"); Millen v. Mayo Found., 170 F.R.D. 462, 464 (D. Minn. 1996)
("Justice is the search for truth in an effort to resolve conflict.").
109. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass.
1991).
110. Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956); accord
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("we agree with
the Tenth Circuit that utilization of the judicial estoppel theory 'would be out
of harmony with [the modem rules of pleading] and would discourage the de-
termination of cases on the basis of the true facts as they might be established
ultimately."').
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adjudication doctrines: as it is frequently put, they render "black
white and crooked straight.""' The goal of accuracy would be better
served by assessing the factual or legal contention in the subsequent
action on its merits, and sustaining the position only if it is true or le-
gally correct. If the issue is a factual one, the prior inconsistent
statement of a party is admissible as evidence, and it can and should
be weighed against other evidence and any explanation for the incon-
sistency."12
111. Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 165 (N.J. 1991) (Stein, J., dissent-
ing); see also United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1977); Miller
v. National City Bank, 166 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1948); In re H.S. Doff &
Co., 274 F. Supp. 739, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Campbell v. Gullo, 78 So. 124,
125 (La. 1918); Pryor v. Gions, 188 So. 2d 739, 741 (La. Ct. App. 1966);
Scruggs v. Butler Furniture Co., 104 So. 2d 178, 180 (La. Ct. App. 1958);
Winston Bros. Co. v. Galloway, 121 P.2d 457, 458 (Or. 1942).
The most prominent expression of the idea is from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352 (1859):
Under the system of that State, the maintenance of public order, the
repose of society, and the quiet of families, require that what has been
definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irre-
fragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in her juris-
prudence, that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata ren-
ders white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked.
Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other evidence can afford
strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can
detract from its legal efficacy.
Id. at 363-64; see also Commissioner of the Taxing Dist. v. Loague, 129 U.S.
493, 505 (1889); Bergeron v. Estate of Loeb, 777 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.
1985); In re Giorgio, 81 B.R. 766, 772 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988); In re Giorgio, 62
B.R. 853, 862 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); In re Scientific Control Corp., 80 F.R.D.
237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Batey v. D.H. Overmyer Warehouse Co., 446
S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969); Ely v. Moore, 11 S.W.2d 294, 297
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
The full Latin maxim is: "[R]es judicata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro
album, ex curvo rectum, ex recto curvum (a decision makes white black; black,
white; the crooked, straight; the straight crooked)." Moorer v. South Carolina,
240 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D.S.C. 1965); see also In re Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 85
A.D.2d 727, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); People ex reL Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc. v. Haring, 146 N.Y.S.2d 151, 159 (1955); Watson v. Goldsmith, 31
S.E.2d 317, 319 (S.C. 1944).
112. See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 437-38. The court in Parkinson reasoned
that the "spirit" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "must reject the theory
that the pleading of a claim under oath.., irrevocably freezes the contentions
of the pleader so that under no circumstances may he alter his view in that, or
another, case, or assert an inconsistent position." Id. at 438 (citing FED. R.
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It might be argued that the doctrine of judicial estoppel deters
the assertion of false positions by imposing a sanction. If a party as-
serts a false or legally incorrect position in a prior action, the party
will be deprived of any benefit it might receive from asserting the
true facts or correct law in a subsequent action. But it is far from ob-
vious that the net effect of the judicial estoppel doctrine improves
systemic accuracy by deterring misrepresentations. Unlike the
criminal law, which is codified and publicized, judicial estoppel is an
obscure legal doctrine. Moreover, far from being swift and certain,
the imposition of judicial estoppel as a punishment for misrepresen-
tation in a prior action will likely be delayed and haphazard. Finally,
the question arises as to the proportionality of judicial estoppel as a
punishment for misrepresentation. Although the stakes in the prior
and subsequent actions might, as a matter of coincidence, be roughly
proportional, they might just as well be wildly disproportionate. The
effect of the sanction might be so small as to be wholly ineffective,
or it might be so large as to be grossly unjust.
One final point should be made about the effect of judicial es-
toppel on accuracy. Many courts hold that a party cannot be judi-
cially estopped if the party did not prevail in the prior action or if the
court did not adopt the party's position. 113 If an identical issue was
actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior litigation, then
the doctrine of judicial estoppel is unnecessary since the case can be
handled by the principles of issue preclusion. If one of the require-
ments for issue preclusion is not met, if for example the issues are
Civ. P. 8(e)(2)).
113. See General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1505
(9th Cir. 1995) (judicial estoppel is properly invoked if court actually adopted
earlier inconsistent statement); Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758,
762 (5th Cir. 1994); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993); Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d
260, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he party to be estopped must have convinced
the first court to adopt its position; a litigant is not forever bound to a losing
argument.").
Some courts have held that judicial estoppel can apply even if the party
was not successful in the prior proceeding if the court finds that its integrity
was undermined by the party engaging in "fast and loose" behavior. See, e.g.,
United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (judicial estoppel
can apply even if party was previously unsuccessful).
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not truly identical, then the concerns of policy and principle that ar-
gue against granting issue preclusive effect would also seem to argue
against judicial estoppel.
Some courts, however, have suggested that judicial estoppel dif-
fers from issue preclusion in that judicial estoppel allows preclusion
on the basis of a prior inconsistent position that was not actually liti-
gated and decided in the prior adjudication. 114 If there has been no
actual litigation and decision, then the policy of judicial efficiency
and economy that supports the application of issue preclusion and
overrides the concern for accuracy in the subsequent litigation is not
present-resources have not been invested in the determination of
the issue in the prior action. Moreover, a substantial question of
fairness arises in connection with the application of judicial estoppel
to a party who has not prevailed on the basis of his prior inconsistent
position. It is surely easy to imagine that a litigant might take a po-
sition in good faith in the prior litigation and lose. If the rules of
claim preclusion do not bar the subsequent action, then it seems per-
verse to preclude the litigant from adjusting to the judicial determi-
nation that his position was incorrect and from seeking another rem-
edy. For example, consider a variation on the facts of Cleveland.
Suppose that Ms. Cleveland were denied disability benefits on the
ground that she could work with a reasonable accommodation.
Surely, she should not then be precluded from bringing a lawsuit if
her employer fails to provide such an accommodation. Yet it is pre-
cisely this perverse result that strict application of the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel would require.
If Ms. Cleveland brought her social security disability claims
with her ADA claims in federal court, then Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(e)(2) would have permitted her to assert both claims in
the alternative. 1 5 But because the disability claim could only be as-
114. See Scarano v. Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 1953)
("Nor is the estoppel relied on here equivalent to 'collateral estoppel' as that
term is used in the Restatement of Judgments. That concept gives to the de-
termination of actually litigated issues by valid and final judgment conclusive-
ness in all further litigation between the same parties. Since, on the present re-
cord, there is a substantial dispute as to what the former judgment decided
about plaintiff's physical condition, collateral estoppel cannot be employed at
this stage.") (citations omitted).
115. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e)(2). Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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serted in an administrative tribunal with limited subject matter juris-
diction, this option was not available to Ms. Cleveland. 1 6 In these
circumstances, the policies that support pleading in the alternative
would also support actions in the alternative."
17
Judge Moore provided an eloquent summary of the relationship
between the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the search for truth in
an opinion for the Second Circuit:
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, as urged here, would ex-
tend estoppel beyond all reasonable bounds. In finding
facts in a law suit the business of the court is to determine
the truth or falsity of the controverted propositions of fact.
Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, was not de-
veloped to render immutable all statements or pronounce-
ments of litigants but to protect the parties from the ex-
pense, delay, and harassment attendant upon having to
prove de novo a fact already established in an action be-
tween the same parties or their privies."
18
Judge Moore's point is simple and compelling: If the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel extends beyond the reach of the doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion, it will distort the search for truth without com-
pelling justification.
C. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Cure Unfairness to the Opponent in
the Subsequent Action
The second rationale for judicial estoppel advanced by the Third
Circuit in Scarano v. Central Railroad Company119 was based on the
premise that the assertion of inconsistent positions may result in sub-
stantive unfairness to the opponent in the subsequent action. Surely
this would be the case if plaintiffs were permitted to bring actions
based on inconsistent legal theories and obtain a double recovery
Procedure provides in part: "A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses." Id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1994).
117. On this point, see the excellent discussion in Henkin, supra note 3, at
1730-36.
118. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 259 F.2d 476, 481-82 (2d Cir.
1958).
119. 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953).
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from the same defendant. Such a scenario would be presented by a
hypothetical variation on the facts of Cleveland. Suppose Ms.
Cleveland brought a prior action against PMSC for disability benefits
under an employee benefits plan and obtained a money judgment for
her expected lifetime earnings on the basis of her assertion that she
was permanently and totally disabled. Assume further that she then
brought a subsequent action on the basis that she was a qualified per-
son with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, once
again seeking her expected lifetime earnings. In other words, sup-
pose that she had sought the same damages twice. Under these cir-
cumstances, a good case can be made that her second claim should
be precluded. But it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel to obtain this result, because preclusion would obvi-
ously be available under conventional principles of claim preclusion
or res judicata. As we have already noted, under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Ms. Cleveland would have been allowed to assert
both claims simultaneously, by pleading in the alternative.12
0
The rationale for judicial estoppel based on unfairness to defen-
dants applies only if a mutuality rule is applied. If mutuality is not
required, then the stranger to the prior action against whom an incon-
sistent position is asserted in a subsequent action is not prejudiced.
Rather, the assertion of judicial estoppel in these circumstances is
just as likely to result in an unfair advantage to the party in the sec-
ond action.
This point can be illustrated by the facts of Cleveland. If the
Court applies the judicial estoppel doctrine against Ms. Cleveland,
then there are two possibilities with respect to the merits of her ac-
tion. If Ms. Cleveland's action against PMSC is not meritorious,
then the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel should make
no difference to the outcome of the dispute. PMSC should prevail,
either on summary judgment or at trial. Ms. Cleveland's prior incon-
sistent statements might play a role in the fact-finding process, but
they would simply be evidence to be given its due weight in light of
any explanation Ms. Cleveland offers and all of the other evidence.
If Ms. Cleveland's action against PMSC were meritorious, then the
application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel would create a
120. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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windfall for PMSC. PMSC would avoid liability, even though it ac-
tually had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. In neither
case would the doctrine of judicial estoppel operate to avoid sub-
stantive unfairness to PMSC.
V. CONCLUSION
This brief Commentary on Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corporation raises the question of whether the Supreme
Court should endorse the doctrine of judicial estoppel in its decision.
The answer to that question is "no." What are the implications of
this answer for the disposition of Cleveland? Several options are
available to the Court. One option would be for the Court to reject
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and then consider whether the Fifth
Circuit could be affirmed on other grounds. A slight variation of this
option would involve a remand to the Fifth Circuit, for consideration
of the question whether summary judgment is appropriate on the ba-
sis of Ms. Cleveland's prior inconsistent statements or whether the
doctrine of issue preclusion applies to the question whether she is a
qualified individual with a disability. Yet another option would be
for the Court to affirm the Fifth Circuit on grounds other than judi-
cial estoppel, and explicitly disclaim either approval or disapproval
of an independent doctrine ofjudicial estoppel.
The Supreme Court may disagree with the analysis presented in
this Commentary and decide to endorse the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel. This might or might not result in a decision to affirm the
Fifth Circuit. The Court might conclude that the requirements for
judicial estoppel were not met on a number of grounds. For exam-
ple, the Court might conclude that judicial estoppel requires mutual-
ity and prejudice to the party seeking to assert the estoppel defense.
Accordingly, because PMSC was not a party to the social security
disability application, it could not assert judicial estoppel if mutuality
is required. Alternatively, the Supreme Court might endorse the
doctrine of judicial estoppel but conclude that Ms. Cleveland's posi-
tions were not inconsistent. Indeed, under the substantive law gov-
erning the relationship between the ADA and the Social Security
Act, Ms. Cleveland may be entitled to receive disability benefits
while pursuing a claim that she is entitled to a reasonable accommo-
dation from her employer. Finally, the Court might endorse the
January 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:461
doctrine of judicial estoppel, but conclude that it does not apply
when the prior proceeding was an administrative procedure that dif-
fers fundamentally from "judicial" proceedings between adversary
parties. If the Court chooses any of these options, it should precisely
formulate the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The relationship between
that doctrine and the related doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
should be stated clearly, and the requirements of judicial estoppel
should be formulated with care.
Yet another option exists. The Court might take the position
that it does not need to endorse the doctrine of judicial estoppel be-
cause the requirements for judicial estoppel have not been met on the
facts before it. This option has the consequence that the Supreme
Court will have defined at least some of the elements of a form of
preclusion whose very existence will be cast into doubt by the Court.
This would, I think, be the most unfortunate choice the Court could
make. Even within the scope of this brief Commentary, the uncer-
tainty and confusion engendered by the doctrine of judicial estoppel
has become apparent. Because judicial estoppel is a form of preclu-
sion, there is a special need for clarity and certainty in the law that
governs the doctrine. Parties need the ability to gauge the effect that
assertions made in one lawsuit will have in future litigation. A deci-
sion that puts the doctrine of judicial estoppel in limbo would un-
dermine the law developed in the various circuits without putting
anything in its place, thus worsening an already bad situation.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel may once have had a role to
play in American procedure. Judicial estoppel may have filled the
gaps in the emerging doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, judicial estop-
pel may have been part of a system that gave judges substantial dis-
cretion to withhold relevant facts from the jury. Before the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the doctrine of judicial estoppel may have
been consistent with a system of pleading that did not allow allega-
tions in the alternative. All of this may once have been true. But the
procedural landscape has changed, and with it, the rationale for an
independent doctrine of judicial estoppel has eroded. The costs of
that doctrine are now substantial, and its benefits are dubious.
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation should not be
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the occasion for the Supreme Court to endorse the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel.
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